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ABSTRACT 
The apparent success of Singapore-styled industrial parks in attracting foreign investments into 
the emerging Asian economies to capitalize on cheap and abundant resources has led, pari passu, to a 
mushrooming of similarly-patterned competitor parks in close proximity to the flagship projects. Many of 
the competitor parks offer either similar or comparable facilities, lower rates, or, in some cases, both. The 
ensuing dynamic competitive interactions between the competitor parks and the Singapore-styled parks 
have forced a re-examination of the viability of the Singapore advantage in navigating the economics of 
competition, and in sustaining competitive advantage. The Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP), 
unsurprisingly, faces this same, familiar predicament; and the premium value placed on its value-added 
services, self-sufficiency, infrastructure and non-corrupt reputation, has been called into question. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In spite of early optimism over the Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP), the vast profits 
envisioned have yet to be realized; a fact primarily due to heightening competition from numerous 
neighboring industrial Parks. These new, smaller-scale industrial Parks do not always match the 
infrastructure and facilities offered at VSIP, nor do they aim to; in contrast, they compete on price, 
charging only a fraction of VSIP’s `packaged’ fees. VSIP initially relied on its excellent infrastructural 
facilities, support services and positive, corrupt-free administrative reputation to attract and retain tenants. 
However, tight, dynamic market conditions have compelled some VSIP tenants to seek out less costly 
alternatives. Experienced and street-savvy industrial-park developers from Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, and 
even Vietnam itself, thus, have grown into a serious cause of concern for VSIP and its investors. 
 
 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Over recent decades, foreign investments have developed into a major force in the global 
economy (Braunerhjelm & Ekholm, 1999). The evolving microeconomics of competition has created a 
completely new array of factors influencing a firm’s investment decisions. Dunning’s eclectic model seeks 
to provide an analytical framework to gauge the scope and extent of multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) 
engagement in cross-border value-adding projects and investments (Dunning 1988, 2001). This paradigm 
proposes that the amalgamation of spatially-transferable intermediate products of the home country with 
the static factor endowments of the host country provides a potent formula for attracting investments. 
Current literature suggests even wider realms of the eclectic model, including location competition for 
foreign investments (Lundan, 2003), the agglomeration economies of spatial proximity (Krugman, 1998), 
deliberations on the physical and institutional infrastructure’s role in the attracting new investments (Peck, 
1996) and the business-government nexus in alliance capitalism (Wade, 1990; Dunning 1995, 1997; 
Evans 1995; Woo-Cummings, 1999). 
 
The dynamics between ownership-specific advantages, location-specific advantages and 
internalization-incentive advantages (i.e. OLI advantages) determine the nature of international 
production. Possible contrasting interactions between these OLI advantages are consequent to the 
environment differences, and contrast on firm, industry and nation planes. Firms cautiously consider 
ownership-specific advantages through exploiting firm-specific resources; internalization-incentive 
advantages are derived from aims of reducing transaction costs. The firm’s deliberate choices of location 
reflect two goals; of transferring resources to the host countries, and of gain access to strategic markets 
(Davies and Weinstein, 2003) and strategic assets (Makino and Delios, 1996; Chen and Chen, 1999). 
 
In a collision-course with neoclassical economics, which deals with asset-exploring activities that 
were designed to maximize the current efficiency of firms while searching for lower transaction costs and 
consequential benefits, contemporary economists, such as Porter (1996, 2000), argue that comparative 
and location-specific advantages unique to a vicinity are no longer indispensable aspects to complement 
firm-specific competitiveness. Dunning (1998), amongst others, similarly reiterates the significance of 
created location-advantages. Fundamentally, as created advantages surpass natural assets as the 
pivotal location determinant of investments, the governmental roles in striving for national or regional 
competitiveness would have to be modified.  
 
Several proponents of the new economics of competition believe that governments should 
influence both static and dynamic Location-specific advantages (Lipsey, 1997; World Bank, 1997). Porter 
(1998, 2000) and Stopford (1999) believe governments have to create sustainable and effective 
institutions, facilitate resource upgrading, and encourage continuous development and improvement of 
micro-regional clusters. A cluster, such as the infamous Silicon Valley, is a critical mass of firms or 
institutions in a particular location, whether it is a park, city or nation. Better information, special access 
and other pluses, which are hard to accrue from operating at a distance, are provided by the location 
proximity of institutional, cultural and geographic aspects of firms; with increased dynamism and 
complexity in the global economy, these advantages are becoming pronouncedly important (Porter, 1998). 
 
Singapore’s interests – and active involvement – in VSIP, together with the close collaboration 
with the Vietnamese counterparts, is a stellar example of efforts to synergize Singapore’s advanced 
infrastructure and transparent and efficient management practices with Vietnam’s location-specific 
advantages; i.e. lower costs and proximity to target markets. However, these strategic OLI advantages 
are called into question by the rise of competitor parks in Vietnam, which might be eroding the ownership-
specific and internalization-incentive advantages of VSIP. In this paper, we will analyze whether this 
compelling strategy of tailor-made regional locality, which are promoted and planned as ‘shady corners’ 
(Lundan, 2003) for Asian-based MNEs to regionalize, is indeed still as attractive to the investors. 
 
This paper’s structure is as follows: the subsequent section describes the background of, and the 
philosophy behind, Singapore’s regionalization attempts, as well as their progress thus far. After updates 
on VSIP, the theoretical considerations are applied to the numerical and in-depth case study data 
gathered from our surveys/interviews conducted in Vietnam. The concluding segments discuss the issues 
and challenges facing VSIP, and the implications of our findings on the city-state’s regionalization efforts 
and its approach to industrial township establishment. 
  
SINGAPORE REGIONALIZATION 
 
 Since declaring independence in 1965, Singapore, as a city-state, has been attempting to 
compensate for its limitations in natural resources. From attracting foreign investments, management and 
technology in its early stages of growth, to developing inter-regional and international collaborations, 
Singapore has most recently sought to fuel economic progress by extending its economic hinterland 
beyond its geographic borders.  
 
 In the 1960s, Singapore leveraged on its relatively low-cost labor and pitched itself as an 
investor-friendly, production-efficient locale (Regnier, 1991; Huff, 1995; Pereira, 2000). Focus was placed 
on export-led industrialization. In the 1980s, Singapore’s industrial restructuring, which was accentuated 
in necessity due to the severe recession in 1985 (MTI, 1986), involved the expansion of Singapore’s 
economic horizons beyond its shores, as encapsulated in the policy document, Gearing Up for an 
Enhanced Role in the Global Economy (Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB), 1988). 
Coincidentally, several countries in the region were liberalizing foreign investment controls during the 
period of time. Singapore capitalized on these circumstances and sought to develop an ‘external wing’ 
through investment in these countries. The Strategic Economic Plan (SEP) – Towards a Developed 
Nation (MTI, 1991), spelt out the urgent need to strengthen Singapore’s economic fundamentals, develop 
industry clusters and business niches, and to enhance economic resilience. Local firms were encouraged 
to venture into the region through the introduction of supporting institutions and other bodies, and 
schemes that provided financial support and subsidies (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 1993). 
 
A later policy document, Singapore Unlimited – Regionalization 2000 (SEDB, 1995), described 
Singapore’s regionalization strategy as encompassing three strategic points of approach – private-sector 
initiated regionalization, the undertaking of large-scale regional investment projects, and development of 
industrial sites in the region. The rationale behind the press for regionalization was also succinctly 
expressed in the same policy document: 
 
“Singapore’s regionalization thrust will help it create economic space beyond the island. It 
will enable Singapore to ‘borrow’ the region’s resources and markets. In return, the region 
will also be able to borrow Singapore’s strengths as a global city with international 
linkages.”               (SEDB, 1995, p.9) 
 
 The regionalization initiative emphasized the replication of the city-state’s business environment 
through the establishment of Singapore-styled industrial parks in the regional sites (Perry and Yeoh, 
2000). By placing an emphasis on its high-profile infrastructural development, efficient and trustworthy 
management, Singapore promoted these parks as combinations of local-specific strengths – such as low 
overhead and labor costs – and Singapore’s reputed strengths in management, administration, and 
above all, reputation.  The Singapore government played three key roles in the development of these 
regional townships. Firstly, high-level civil servants and politicians negotiated the institutional frameworks 
of the township developments. Secondly, visits by ministerial delegations placed an even stronger 
prominence on interpersonal (and international) ties (Kumar and Siddique, 1994). These forays were 
often government-initiated and involved a ‘government-selected’ consortium (Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998). 
Lastly, senior government officials played critical roles in the intense promotion of the industrial parks. 
  
 Singapore’s regionalization efforts allowed the city-state to ride on the growth of the region, 
particularly that of China and India (MTI, 2003). From Indonesia (e.g. Batamindo Industrial Park), to China 
(e.g. China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park and Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park), Singapore engaged 
actively in the proliferate establishment of industrial estates and townships across the region, many of 
which have been much in the public eye; amongst its better-known cousins, however, is the relatively 
lower-profile Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP), the focus of this paper. 
 
 
VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK (VSIP) 
 
Singapore has consistently been ranked among the top foreign investors in Vietnam for the past 
15 years. In 2004, Singapore’s investments in Vietnam totaled registered capital of US$7.37 billion, 
involving 288 projects (Saigon Times Weekly, 2004); with, noteworthily, as of August 2003, a large 
portion of this capital tied up in the service sector, followed by those in manufacturing industries. 
 
 The conceptualization of VSIP began, in March 1994, with the then-Vietnam Prime Minister Vo 
Van Kiet and the then-Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. In January 1996, VSIP was officially 
launched. The success recipe adopted in VSIP was very similar to that of earlier Singapore projects, such 
as the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park2; VSIP has a focus of combining Singapore’s strengths 
with location-specific advantages, principally the lean and competitive cost structures, in Vietnam. 
 
Located in Binh Duong Province, VSIP is 40-minute drive from the international airport and 
seaports and 17-kilometers from Vietnam’s commercial centre, Ho Chi Minh City. Such proximity creates 
convenient access to professional services, developed infrastructure and social amenities (VSIP, 2004). 
VSIP is a joint development by a Singapore consortium, led by SembCorp Industries, and Vietnamese 
state-owned enterprise Becamex. 
 
As commented by the Singapore American (2003), VSIP is known for its “high standards of 
infrastructure and service”. Facilities at VSIP are intended to provide ‘one-stop’ service to its tenants. 
VSIP’s utilities include telecommunications, sewage treatment and water treatment facilities. A medical 
centre, business centre and housing are among the amenities that VSIP is considering extending. At 
present, VSIP has an on-site customs office that facilitates inspections within the tenant’s factory sites, 
with customs certification and procedures completed in the Park itself. Other than ready-built factories 
                                                 
2
 In VSIP, Singapore applied lessons learnt from its China experience, and made calculated efforts to encourage collaboration with 
local authorities. A Management Board was set up, chaired by the Vice-chairman of the Binh Duong Province People's Committee; 
this measure anticipated the sensitivity with regards to VSIP being a partnership mandated by the central government. 
(both terrace and detached), VSIP provides recreational facilities as well as such administrative facilities 
as a bank and postal office within its vicinity. 
 
The 200,000-strong working population living within a 15-kilometer radius of VSIP provides a 
ready pool of low-cost labor. For instance, an unskilled operator’s annual wage totals between US$420 to 
US$600, while an engineer costs about US$1,800 to US$2,400 (VSIP, 2004). Furthermore, VSIP places 
significant emphasis on manpower development, as the first Vietnamese Park to construct a training 
centre to develop its human resources. The S$9.5 million Vietnam-Singapore Technical Training Centre 
(VSTTC) provides a source of skilled labor. Priority for its graduates was given to VSIP during the first 5 
years of VSTTC operations. In September 2004, the VSIP Scholarship Fund was launched to assist 
capable students requiring financial aid to continue their education. These scholars, after their graduation, 
eventually become crucial in the development of the province and in propelling VSIP progress. Now into 
its third phase of expansion, VSIP has 110 operating tenants involved in 161 investment projects, 
employing about 33,000 workers. Investment commitment, as at January 2005, totaled US$840 million. 
 
The administration of VSIP has also taken, in recent years, measures to create a number of man-
made advantages for the park. It involves itself actively in creating favourable conditions for tenants; a 
Memorandum of Understanding signed in October 2003 began the implementation of a fast approval 
mechanism to cut waiting times, and corporate income tax treatment for foreign-invested enterprises was 
implemented in January 2004. The real effects of these measures on VSIP’s competitive advantage, 
however, are yet uncertain. 
 
COMPETITOR PARKS 
 
 It was only a matter of time, however, before others attempted to capitalize on the same 
advantages as VSIP; thus the mushrooming of competitor parks around VSIP, aiming to exploit these 
selfsame advantages. These competitor parks share many of the same strengths as VSIP, while shoring 
up its weaknesses; giving the erstwhile ‘first-mover’ a run for its money. These parks include Bien Hoa 
Industrial Zone II and the Tan Thuan Export Processing Zone (EPZ). In our on-site surveys, we surveyed 
the tenant-firms in these two competitor parks to acquire a clearer picture of firm-level location decisions. 
 
Tan Thuan Export Processing Zone (EPZ) 
Tan Thuan EPZ, Vietnam’s first EPZ was awarded the ISO 9001 in 2001. A combination of an 
industrial Park and export facilities, the 300Ha EPZ is the Vietnamese response to development needs of 
Ho Chi Minh City in the early 1990s; more established, in fact, than VSIP. The Tan Thuan Industrial 
Promotion Company (TTIPC), which is the joint venture partner of the Central Trading & Development 
Group (CT&D), manages this EPZ. Interestingly, CT&D, based in Taiwan (Republic of China), received 
the Labor Order in 2001 on grounds of the social benefits accrued to the local community; creating a 
philanthropic ‘advantage’ that CT&D uses to attract corporations to the Tan Thuan EPZ (CT&D, 2004). 
 
The location of the EPZ is strategic – lying within a 4-km radius from downtown Ho Chi Minh City. 
The EPZ also places emphasis on the investor’s lifestyle, with well-planned residential neighborhoods, 
medical services, leisure facilities, and other amenities. A strategic advantage in the development of Tan 
Thuan EPZ, compared to VSIP, is that the EPZ is a part of a bigger development of Saigon South. 
Furthermore, the EPZ offers ready-built standard factories for purchase and lease. The 4-year tax holiday 
(from the first profitable year), followed by 50% tax deduction for another 4 years for all tenants also forms 
a pull-factor no less magnetic than VSIP’s politically-negotiated concessions.  
 
An on-site visit reveals that, a majority of the 160 companies (as of April 2004) established at the 
EPZ are Taiwanese and Japanese companies; similarly, a majority of the companies engage in 
manufacturing services, from textiles to computer chips and machinery. By 2004, Tan Thuan EPZ 
attracted a total of US$777.16 million in investments and achieved an occupancy rate of 77.17%. 
According to CT&D (2004b), more than 75% of the tenants have increased their investments and 
expanded operations. The EPZ has also been recognized as one of the best Asian EPZs, by such 
international bodies as the Economist Intelligence Unit.  
Bien Hoa Industrial Zone (IZ) II 
 The 365-hectares Bien Hoa Industrial Zone (IZ) II, established in 1995, is operated by Sonadezi 
Bien Hoa, a state-owned Vietnamese company – again, an older establishment than VSIP. The IZ is 
highly accessible, located in Bien Hoa City; 30 km from Ho Chi Minh City Centre and 2 km from Dong Nai 
Port. The IZ also has comprehensive utilities, including a fire station, clinics and a mall. The infrastructural 
support includes intra-zonal roads and drainages, and a water supply capacity of 15,000 to 30,000 cubic-
meters per day. 
 
Sonadezi Bien Hoa, which currently manages 6 IZs and co-manages another 2 IZs, also co-
coordinated the establishment of the Dong Nai College of Administration and Technology that trains the 
local labor force and provide a steady flow of cheap, skilled workers. The College focuses on 
manufacturing (such as footwear) and on administrative tasks (such as office management); an emphasis 
that parallels VSIP’s efforts in manpower development. 
 
 As with the Tan Thuan EPZ, the majority of tenants at Bien Hoa IZ II hail from Taiwan, Japan and 
Vietnam. The Zone has attracted about US$1.3 billion in investment and created over 42,000 jobs since 
its establishment. With a favorable location and provision of ‘one-stop’ service similar to the Singapore-
styled service VSIP offers, the IZ enjoys high occupancy rates (90% in 2003). The Dong Nai Industrial 
Zones Authority (DIZA), in charge of processing and procedures for investors, facilitates this ‘one-stop’ 
service by eliminating bureaucratic red tape, allowing the prompt and easy obtaining of necessary 
documents such as import/export permits, work permits and, most importantly, investment licenses. 
 
 VSIP’s rivals, as illustrated above, are not just credible and tough, but also established as well. 
Far from playing the complementary roles to the development of VSIP once envisioned as a possibility, 
the dynamic of interaction between VSIP and these rival parks have instead evolved into a circumstance 
of competition for investor confidence, support, and commitment. In subsequent sections of the paper, we 
will further elaborate on the impact of the new dimensions and dynamics that such competitor Parks have 
imposed – and are imposing – on VSIP’s efforts in attracting investors. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
Research Methodology 
 
Prior analyses on the Parks have relied primarily on secondary data from official publications, 
press reports, etc. To obtain primary data on the differential impact of various pull factors on firms’ 
investment decisions, as well as that of various constraints on their operations, we have adopted a 
modified form of the survey questionnaire developed in Yeoh, et al (2000), and surveyed the tenants in 
VSIP, and its competitor parks, Tan Thuan Export Processing Zone and Bien Hoa Industrial Zone II. 
 
The 3-part questionnaire queried the respondents’ profiles, the differential effects of various 
push/pull factors on the tenant-firms’ location decisions, and the operational constraints they 
encountered. Other questions pertaining to the respondents’ views on the facilities and services in the 
parks were culled from the open-ended questions. In total, 80 responses were collected from these parks. 
The fieldwork was conducted between December 2004 and October 2004. Our survey results and 
analyses are presented as follows. 
 
 Profile of Respondents 
There were 28 respondents in the VSIP survey, of which 7 were wholly Singapore-owned, 1 was 
Singaporean joint venture, and 20 were wholly foreign-owned. Respondents were mainly involved in the 
manufacture of consumer products; 7 were involved in the manufacture of intermediate products, and the 
remaining in capital goods or in the provision of industrial services. There were 14 respondents with a 
sales turnover of less than US$5 million, while the remaining respondents’ turnovers topped US$5 million. 
 
 Of the 52 respondents from the competitor parks, 20 were from Bien Hoa Industrial Zone II while 
32 were from Tan Thuan EPZ. In entirety, there were 3 were wholly Vietnam-owned, 44 were wholly 
foreign-owned and 3 were joint ventures. As for the nature of their operations, 15 of the respondents were 
involved in manufacturing of consumer products, 17 in manufacturing intermediate products, 4 in capital 
goods, while the remaining were involved in industrial services. 20 respondents had a sales turnover less 
than US$5 million and 16 respondents had a turnover between US$5 million and US$50 million. 
 
Statistical Treatment of Survey Results 
 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the responses related to 
factors and constraints, a logit analysis was used to compare the push/pull factors influencing the tenants’ 
decision to locate in the Parks. The logit model, estimated by the maximum likelihood, takes the following 
form: 
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where: F1 = 1 if “Political commitment from the Vietnam government” is selected, 0 otherwise  
F2 = 1 if “Stable government” is selected, 0 otherwise 
F3 = 1 if “Investment Incentives” is selected, 0 otherwise 
F4 = 1 if “Availability of Raw Materials” is selected, 0 otherwise 
F5 = 1 if “Reliable infrastructure facilities” is selected, 0 otherwise 
F6 = 1 if “One-stop services” is selected, 0 otherwise 
F7 = 1 if “Access to domestic market” is selected, 0 otherwise 
α0 = constant term 
αi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
Estimated coefficients in the logit model, if statistically significant, would suggest that the firm 
choosing the particular push/pull factor is more likely to be from VSIP than from competitor Parks.  
 
A similar logit model was applied to the constraints faced by the Parks’ tenants: 
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 where: Pi is the probability of firm being located in the particular park 
e refers to the exponentiation operator, and 
Zi is a linear function of the constraints defined as  
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 where: i = 1 to n, depending on the type of constraint 
Ci = 1 if constraint i is selected, 0 otherwise  
β0 = constant term 
βi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
In this case, estimated coefficients in the logit model, if positive and statistically significant, would 
suggest that the firm choosing that particular constraint is more likely to be from VSIP than from 
competitor parks. 
 
Factors influencing respondents’ decision to invest in VSIP/Competitor Parks (Table 2) 
 
 Investment incentives offered by the parks was the most popularly stated consideration for the 
situating of operations in all three parks; 61% of the VSIP respondents and 92% of competitor parks 
respondents felt that the investment incentives, as part of the investment climate, were particularly vital in 
the firm’s decision to invest in the park. Compared to VSIP firms, the firms in the competitor parks are 
more likely to locate in a park on grounds of investment incentives, as indicated by the negative and 
statistically significant α3 (-2.205); possibly a signal of more attractive incentives being offered by the 
competitor parks. In VSIP’s case, however, ‘stable infrastructure’ was just as popularly quoted as 
investment incentives, as reflected by the strong positive and statistically significant α5 (3.325); 
considering this, it is possible that in VSIP’s case, the investment incentives were only as attractive as the 
promised stability and reliability of its Singapore-styled infrastructure; in other words, taken together, it is 
possibly less a signal of more attractive incentives being offered by competitors, than one of the high 
import placed on the Singapore-styled infrastructure by tenants. 
 
 Political commitment also weighed in heavily as a crucial pull factor, with about 46% of 
respondents from both VSIP and competitor parks quoting it. For competitor parks, of course, this was in 
reference to commitment from the Vietnamese government; but interestingly, for VSIP, the distribution 
was still skewed heavily towards commitment from the host government, with only 10% citing commitment 
from the Singapore government as opposed to 36% citing commitment from the Vietnamese government. 
Singapore’s political capital, it would seem, is little sought after by investors; whereas Vietnamese political 
capital seems to not just be in high demand, but also in high supply, given the high likelihood of it being a 
factor in the location decisions of firms in competitor parks, as indicated by the large negative α1 (-2.621) 
– in other words, support from the host government would seem to be far from an exclusive right of VSIP. 
It is worth noting, however, that political commitment was, despite the high number of respondents 
quoting it, only the sixth most often cited factor for respondents from VSIP; possibly signaling a difference 
in priorities between investors in VSIP and competitor parks. 
  
Constraints on Respondents' Operations in VSIP/Competitor Parks (Table 3) 
 Our study identifies implicitly the emerging constraints that are beginning to pose limitations to 
VSIP and its competitors. These constraints were broadly classified into three categories; labor-related, 
organization and technology-related, and local ‘environment’-related (e.g. regulatory and competitive). 
  
Labour-related constraints 
 Shortage of professionals and managers was cited by both VSIP and competitor-park tenants as 
being among the most critical constraints. The moderate and significant positive βi (1.776) implies that 
firms situated in VSIP are more likely to face such constraints. With 75% of VSIP respondents recognizing 
this constraint, VSIP’s ability to provide a steady flow of managerial and professional labor is severely in 
question; in contrast, only 44% of non-VSIP tenants face a similar predicament. This is a probable 
indication of an urgent need for VSIP to train and develop professionals; almost certainly it is one of the 
VSIP’s weaknesses which the park’s competitors have managed to improve on. 
 
 Another statistically significant constraint identified was the problem of high absenteeism. 32% of 
non-VSIP firms felt that high absenteeism was a considerable constraint, while 11% of VSIP respondents 
had similar perceptions; however, the moderate positive βi (1.776) indicates that firms experiencing the 
constraint of high absenteeism were somewhat more likely to be from VSIP, implying a disparity in worker 
commitment between VSIP and its competitors. The possible implications are myriad and manifold; 
perhaps labour discipline is lacking, perhaps workers feel themselves to not be treated as well – or 
perhaps, even, due to the Singapore connection, and the idea of imposed foreign ownership which the 
Singapore government tried to avoid creating. The last, however, is not highly likely, given that tenants in 
the competitor parks do, indeed, still find it to be a major problem. 
 
A shortage of semi-skilled and unskilled labor was also quoted as one of the largest labour-
related constraints on operations, with this factor being most often quoted by respondents from the 
competitor parks, and second-most often quoted by VSIP respondents. This appears to be a universal 
constraint and is likely more due to locational factors than any policy of VSIP or its competitors. 
  
Organizational and technological-related constraints 
The distribution of citations of technological-related constraints was markedly less slanted 
towards any given factor, but several observations can still be made. Difficulty in obtaining capital 
equipment featured as the second most popularly-ranked technology-related constraint faced by both 
VSIP and competitor-park tenants. The small but statistically significant and negative βi (-1.027) indicates 
that firms facing such a constraint are probably not from VSIP. This result implies an apparent advantage 
of VSIP in terms of procurement of capital equipment; perhaps due to its higher degree of establishment 
in its current business model, as compared to the older, but more recently re-engineered competitor 
parks. Similarly, the small but significant negative βi (-1.027) indicates that a firm in the competitor parks 
is more likely to be constrained due to a lack of good supporting services. Again, the result is to VSIP’s 
advantage. Promoting the park with its ‘reliable and efficient supporting services’, VSIP needs to further 
improve in this aspect; particularly since 21% of VSIP respondents, too, experience this constraint. While 
it is a weakness of VSIP that the competitor parks have not (yet) improved on, it is nonetheless a 
weakness, and should be viewed as such. 
 
`Environmental’ constraints 
‘Impact of host government regulations’ and ‘competition from overseas industry competitors’ 
were the highest popularly-ranked constraints faced by both VSIP’s and non-VSIP parks’ tenants. 
However, the survey results are not statistically significant for analysis; both VSIP and its competitors 
seem to be affected equally by these limitations, with no additional support, governmental or otherwise, 
for either.  
 
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
 Differentiating itself as a one-stop service centre, with strengths of reliable infrastructure, efficient 
administration and strong political commitment from both Singapore and Vietnam, VSIP appears to be a 
typical Singapore-styled park. In recent years, VSIP has apparently secured a lead over its competitors, 
on grounds of the unparalleled and exclusive concessions it awards to its tenants… or at least, that would 
be the common belief. Conversely, however, our survey results and logit analyses reflect the erosion of 
such competitive advantages of VSIP, with the ascendance of other competitor parks. The dawn of these 
parks – established by other experienced and street-savvy developers from Taiwan, Japan and Thailand, 
and many with their own historical pedigree – have brought new challenges for VSIP. 
  
With more attractive investment incentives, political support, and business-friendly schemes, the 
competitor parks are prying away investments from VSIP – all while retaining the worrying ability to 
undercut the cost margins of VSIP. Possibly this is due to a willingness to accept lower profits on the part 
of the competitors, or more probably due to the continuing perception of a premium on the part of VSIP, 
as we discuss below; but it is without a doubt that VSIP is currently at a great disadvantage in terms of 
price, that great classical definitor of demand and supply. 
 
 The reliable, Singapore-styled infrastructure remains the main appeal of VSIP. The relevance of 
VSIP’s infrastructural advantages, however, has been eroded by a decade of improvements in 
communications and transport networks, the national power grid and other supporting infrastructures; 
fueled, partially, by the investment of VSIP itself. To exacerbate matters, VSIP charges higher fees for 
use of its ‘superior’ infrastructure; now, however, the rise of competitor parks that have more aggressive 
pricing, while offering comparable facilities, has challenged the premium levied by VSIP. Moreover, the 
locational advantage of VSIP has been worn out by the rise of more strategically-located parks. For 
instance, Tan Thuan EPZ is located in Ho Chi Minh City itself, and has better accessibility and proximity 
vis-à-vis VSIP. The strategic geographic advantage that VSIP once had, too, has been eroded. 
 
The other dimension of the Singapore dimension – the city-state’s political support – also seems 
to be of far less significance than originally envisioned. Our figures suggest the political commitment of 
the Vietnam government is often viewed as more crucial than that of the Singapore government. VSIP 
might thus consider a realignment of interests (possibly a la Suzhou Industrial Park) to greater represent 
the Vietnamese government’s interest; however, with several locally-owned parks among its competitors, 
and with the Vietnamese government’s support of many of these competitors, it is unclear how much of a 
real effect this would have.  
 
VSIP also faces challenges in the competitiveness of its labor force. As reflected in our logit 
analyses, VSIP tenants are largely concerned about the park’s ability to provide a steady flow of 
managerial and professional labor. Competitor parks are also perceived to have a somewhat better 
foundation than VSIP in this aspect. The VSTTC and the provision of scholarships would seem to barely 
form a scaffold for the structure that needs to come; VSIP needs to intensify its training initiatives and 
efforts. Shortage of professional labor hinders development of higher-end value-added manufacturing 
operations. Our surveys also reveal many tenants being obliged to train locals in-house or to recruit 
professionals at a higher fee; certainly this is another economic reality that might – and, from our figures, 
probably does, turn investors away from VSIP. High absenteeism, too, is another constraint suffered 
more by VSIP than by its competitors. Measures should be taken to find the reasons for this pattern of 
absenteeism, and to correct it as far as possible; lest such labor constraints, apparently more pronounced 
in VSIP than competitor parks, continue to erode VSIP’s competitiveness.  
 
 Possible distinctions VSIP can develop on are the areas of procurement of technology and capital 
equipment, and the provision of good supporting services. As indicated in our logit analyses, VSIP 
tenants are comparatively less likely to face poor supporting services, or difficulties in acquiring capital 
equipment. VSIP’s Singapore-styled industrial park management might be the reason behind these 
resilient strengths. The relatively better-quality information systems in VSIP should be further enhanced to 
create a characteristic niche for the Park. This competitive strategy should be implemented with 
consideration to other possible measures; including sensitivity to a business’s operating expenses. It is 
certain, however, that VSIP does not enjoy a static and constant advantage in this area; continuous 
improvement is likely to be almost a requirement to maintain this competitive edge. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The premium value placed on VSIP value-added services, self-sufficiency, infrastructure and non-
corrupt reputation, has apparently been misplaced – or rather, displaced, by the non-VSIP parks 
mushrooming in Vietnam. The economic realities of cost and competition have made their presence 
painfully known to the managers and owners of the Singapore-styled park. However, despite the attrition 
of VSIP’s infrastructural superiority, strategic geography, and competitiveness of its professional 
workforce, the viability of the Park as an investment location can still be salvaged. VSIP does continue to 
provide some of its purported location-specific advantages, such as a low-cost unskilled labor force; and 
while these are quickly being eroded by its competitors, it maintains an (albeit small) edge in capital 
procurement, provision of supporting services, and other administrative matters. By improving on these 
distinct advantages and working to constantly enhance its eroded strengths, VSIP can remain competitive; 
but how it will do so remains to be seen. The challenge to VSIP is a matching response of appropriate 
urgency to retain the competitiveness of VSIP; what form this response should – or can – take, however, 
is yet unclear. At the least, however, it is likely to be one economic, and not political, in nature. 
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Table I 
 
Comparison VSIP and competitor Parks 
 
  
Vietnam-Singapore 
Industrial Park (VSIP) 
Bien Hoa  
Industrial Zone II 
Tan Thuan Export 
Processing Zone (EPZ) 
Developer 
Singapore consortium 
led by SembCorp 
Industries;  
Vietnamese state-owned 
enterprise (Becamex) 
State-owned Vietnamese 
company  
(Sonadezi Bien Hoa) 
70% Tan Thuan Industrial 
Promotion Corporation; 
30% Central Trading & 
Development Group  
Year of 
Establishment 1996 1995 1991 
Location Binh Duong Dong Nai Ho Chi Minh 
Proximity  
(from Ho Chi 
Minh Centre) 
17-Km 30-Km 4-Km 
Development 
Size 
500-hectares  
(320-hectares1 are/have 
been developed);  
Option of another  
500-hectares 
365-Hectares4  
(of which 90% occupied) 300-hectares
6
 
Total 
Investment US$840 million
2
 US$1.3billion5 US$777.16 million6 
Operating 
Tenants About 110 tenants
1
 About 94 tenants4 About 160 tenants6 
Vietnam-Singapore 
Technical Training 
Centre (VSTTC) 
Vocational training 
schools 
HEPZA's College of 
Technology and Industrial 
Management Training 
VSIP Scholarship Fund - - 
'One-stop' 
Service Yes Yes Yes 
Ready-built 
factories  Yes Yes Yes 
Investment 
Incentives 
Allows for tax incentives 
(including 2 years tax 
exemption period for 
certain industries) 
Allows for tax incentives 
(clean and hi-tech 
industries) 
Allows for tax incentives 
(including 4 years tax 
exemption starting from the 
first profitable year)  
Accolades 
Known for high 
standards of 
infrastructure & service3 
- 
First EPZ to be accredited 
ISO 140019002 worldwide 
    
1
 - Correct as of May 2004 
2
 - Correct as of January 2005 
3
 - According to the Singapore American (2003) 
4
 - Correct as of August 2003 
5
 - Since Park Establishment 
6
 - Correct as of 2004 
Table II 
 
Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decisions to Invest in VSIP/Non-VSIP Parks 
 
Popular Ranking Maximum Likelihood 
Estimates - Binary 
Logitsψ 
VSIP Non-VSIP 
Variables 
α ι p-valueφ Frequency Rank 
Frequenc
y 
Ran
k 
Political commitment from 
Vietnam Government -2.621 0.034 ** 10 6 21 2 
Stable government -2.020 0.083 * 13 4 18 4 
Investment incentives -2.205 0.017 ** 17 1 44 1 
Availability of raw material 3.909 0.027 ** 2 7 1 7 
Reliable infrastructure 3.325 0.0001 *** 17 1 12 5 
One-stop service 1.598 0.067 * 12 5 19 3 
Access to domestic market -1.442 0.069 * 14 3 12 5 
Constant 1.470 0.210      
 
 
Note:  ψ Estimated values were taken from “forced entry” regression.    
φ
 p-values are for 2-tailed tests. 
* Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 10% level 
 
Source: Questionnaire surveys. 
Table III 
 
Major Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations in VSIP/Non-VSIP Parks 
 
Popular Ranking Maximum Likelihood 
Estimates - Binary 
Logitsψ 
VSIP Non-VSIP 
Variables 
α ι p-valueφ 
Frequenc
y Rank 
Frequenc
y 
Ran
k 
Labour Constraint        
Shortage of semi/unskilled 
labour -0.914 0.145  14 2 30 1 
Shortage of  professionals 
and managers 1.776 0.005 *** 21 1 21 2 
Shortage of R&D Personnel -0.487 0.448  9 3 15 4 
Rising labour cost -1.324 0.160  2 6 8 6 
Low labour productivity -1.175 0.090 * 5 4 17 3 
High absenteeism 2.238 0.008 *** 3 5 15 4 
Constant -0.050 0.932      
Organizational/Technological 
Constraints        
Difficulty in obtaining capital 
equipment -1.027 0.090 * 7 2 19 2 
Difficulty in obtaining raw 
material -0.589 0.316  11 1 24 1 
Difficulty in introducing new 
technology and implementing 
new techniques 
-0.736 0.258  5 5 12 5 
Lack of good supporting 
services -1.197 0.066 * 6 4 17 3 
Popular Ranking Maximum Likelihood 
Estimates - Binary 
Logitsψ VSIP Non-VSIP Variables 
α ι p-valueφ 
Frequenc
y Rank 
Frequenc
y 
Ran
k 
Difficulty in securing funds for 
expansion -1.239 0.143  3 7 8 6 
High overheads -0.797 0.200  7 2 16 4 
Others -1.650 0.064 * 5 5 8 6 
Constant 1.355 0.059 *     
Environmental Constraints        
Impact of government 
regulation 0.707 0.235  15 1 16 2 
Competition from overseas 
Parks 0.378 0.527  14 2 22 1 
Protectionistic Barrier: 
restricting market access to 
developing countries 
-0.187 0.819  3 3 10 3 
Protectionistic Barrier: 
restricting market access to 
developed countries 
-0.636 0.432  3 3 9 4 
Others 2.193 0.017 ** 1 5 2 5 
Constant -1.074 0.111      
 
 
Note:  ψ Estimated values were taken from “forced entry” regression.    
φ
 p-values are for 2-tailed tests. 
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
Source: Questionnaire surveys. 
